It starts with a check in the mail. Somewhere between your business office and the vendor, the envelope is stolen. The payee name and amount are chemically washed off and rewritten, or the check’s image is lifted and used to manufacture counterfeits. By the time anyone notices, the money is gone, and recovery is slow and uncertain.
This is not a hypothetical. A FinCEN analysis of just six months found 15,417 reports of mail theft-related check activity totaling more than $688 million, including altered checks, fraudulently signed and deposited checks, and counterfeit checks. In recent months, Michigan Schools Energy Cooperative (MISEC) member districts have begun to experience an uptick in check washing and lost mail.
At a recent risk management conference, MISEC finance staff and PNC Bank treasury management experts walked school business officials through how this fraud works and the controls that stop it.

Source: FinCEN, Financial Trend Analysis: Mail Theft-Related Check Fraud, February to August 2023
How check fraud happens
- Check washing: the payee or amount is chemically removed from a real check and changed.
- Check cooking: a stolen check image is digitally altered to manufacture new checks.
- Counterfeit checks: legitimate routing and account numbers are reused on fake checks.
- Forged endorsement: an authentic check is deposited by someone it was never intended for.
- Mail theft: checks are stolen before or during delivery.
A paper check carries more than one payment’s worth of risk. Printed on every check are your routing number, account number, and an authorized signature, everything a criminal needs to keep drawing on the account. One stolen check can mean cash loss, stop-payment and account-replacement work, delayed vendor payments, reconciliation headaches, and disclosure concerns.
The safer way to pay: ACH, protected by UPIC
Moving from paper checks to electronic payments through the Automated Clearing House (ACH) network removes the envelope from the equation. ACH payments process faster and more reliably, cost less to administer, and never sit in a mailbox waiting to be stolen.
MISEC has adopted modern treasury management tools, including a Universal Payment Identification Code (UPIC). A UPIC works like a deposit-only mailing address for money: districts send ACH payments to the UPIC, which masks MISEC’s actual account and routing information, accepts incoming ACH credits only, and blocks ACH debits. MISEC’s real account details are never exposed. (A UPIC is for incoming ACH credits only; it is not a wire payment option.)

If your district still writes checks
Some checks are unavoidable for now. Where they remain, focus on catching problems before the money leaves:
- Payee Positive Pay: your bank matches each check’s number, amount, and payee name against your records and presents anything that does not match for a pay-or-return decision. Confirm your bank matches the payee, not just the serial number and amount.
- Daily exception review: assign a primary reviewer and a backup, set a documented deadline, and know what your bank does by default if nobody responds. The strongest check control is a timely, authorized exception decision before payment.
- Reduce exposure: secure check stock and signature devices, use controlled or traceable mail delivery, and ask your bank about dedicated accounts, check blocks, limits, and ACH filters.
The other scam: payment diversion
Check fraud is not the only threat. In payment diversion schemes, a criminal impersonates a vendor, often through a compromised or look-alike email account, and asks your district to change where payments are sent. One rule stops most of these:
The golden rule: Never change vendor payment instructions based solely on an email request, even if the email appears to come from a trusted vendor or an existing conversation.
If you receive an email asking to change payment information:
- Do not act on the email alone. Treat every request to change banking information, payment methods, or remittance instructions as potentially fraudulent.
- Do not reply to verify. Do not use the email, links, or phone number in the message; the vendor’s email may be compromised.
- Independently contact the vendor. Call a previously verified phone number from your records and speak with an authorized representative.
- Document and require second approval. Record who verified the change and what was confirmed, and require a second authorized employee to approve the update.
- Hold the change or payment if it is not verified. Do not update payment records or release funds until the request has been independently authenticated.
Red flags include urgent or last-minute payment changes, a new bank account or payment method, an unfamiliar or slightly altered email address, requests to bypass normal procedures, and pressure, secrecy, or threats of late fees.

If fraud is suspected
- Contact your financial institution immediately to request a recall or recovery.
- Notify your IT or security team.
- Preserve emails, invoices, and related records.
- Report the incident to your cyber insurer and law enforcement.
Layered, disciplined, and timely
No single control eliminates bank fraud. The strongest defense layers them: reduce check use, protect account information, require independent approval for changes, and review exceptions daily, before funds are released.
School districts interested in transitioning to ACH payments or learning more about financial fraud prevention are encouraged to contact MISEC for assistance.
